Job Market Papers:
Boundary Defense: Evidence from a Referendum Against Tracking Reform
Abstract:
Policies that reinforce unequal opportunity persist in democracies. I develop a theory of boundary defense to explain why. Middle-class families defend these opportunity boundaries against reform when they lack alternatives for status maintenance. The size and success of these marginal insiders depends on institutional context. Applied to Germany, I interpret early-age tracking of students across schools as an opportunity boundary excluding immigrant children and argue that status-anxious German families defend it against reform. To test observable implications, I introduce a 2010 referendum that blocked early-age tracking reform in Hamburg and collect polling-place level votes, city-district demographics, survey data, and qualitative media accounts. Results show referendum support was highest in places where German families faced academic competition from immigrants, among less educated parents, and predicts electoral backlash against reformers. I conclude with comparative applications and suggest boundary defense leads actors seeking fairer opportunity to form coalitions that pursue less confrontational reforms.
Business Power and Local Dependence: Evidence from the Dodd-Frank Rollback
Abstract:
Specific US banks secured looser risk oversight when Congress rolled back the Dodd-Frank Act in 2018. Existing theories suggest large US banks wield instrumental influence to secure deregulation, but this rollback benefited smaller banks. I explain this with a theory of local dependence, arguing that geographically concentrated and represented firms use local disinvestment threats to influence policy. I hypothesize that local dependence on banks predicts representatives' votes for the rollback, and test this by linking district-level local dependence on banks, bank-representative instrumental influence, and roll-call votes. Results show that realized disinvestment threats predict rollback support unconditionally, while instrumental influence only predicts support for low-salience precursor bills or when complementing prospective disinvestment. Qualitative evidence provides further support. I conclude by suggesting this outcome shows how specific US firms constrain policy agendas due to their delegated local social policy functions, and that such domestic politics can help explain failed consensus in international policymaking.
Book Project:
Opportunity Boundaries: The Politics of Fair Chances in Rich Democracies
Peer-Reviewed Publications:
Abstract:
We examine whether U.S. banks subject to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) reduce lending (an unintended consequence) and/or become more resilient to liquidity shocks, as intended by regulators. We find that LCR banks tighten lending standards, and reduce liquidity creation that occurs mainly through lower lending relative to non-LCR banks. However, covered banks also contribute less to fire-sale externalities relative to exempt banks. For LCR banks, we estimate that the total after-tax benefits of reduced fire-sale risk (net of the costs associated with foregone lending) exceed $50 billion from 2013Q2 to 2017, mostly accruing to the largest LCR banks. Non-LCR regulations enacted during our sample period cannot fully account for these findings. For the banking sector as a whole, lending migrates to smaller, non-LCR banks so that lending shares increase but fire-sale risk does not decrease. Our results highlight the trade-off between liquidity creation and resiliency arising from liquidity regulations that underlie the debate on whether the LCR should be extended following the banking crisis of March 2023.
[Link], [SSRN Full Text]
Works in Progress:
(Presented: APSA 2024)
(Presented: WPSA 2025)
(Presented: APSA Teaching and Learning Conference 2025)
Other Writing:
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